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Robert F. Conrad*
Variable Rate Severance Taxes:
Impact and Incidence
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes two issues. First, the paper will address incentives,
both positive and negative, related to variable rate output taxes. A simple
economic model of mining operations allows an examination of the in-
centives created by two types of such taxes introduced recently by different
states. This analysis shows that these taxes may affect the time profile of
extraction, the level of investment, and the quantity of economically
recoverable reserves. Second, the paper will address the incidence of
variable rate output taxes. The extent to which incentives are realized
will be determined by the ability of the mine operators to shift the tax
either forward to consumers through higher prices, or backward to labor
or to owners of the natural resource base. Thus, the issues of incentives
and incidence appear to be linked. This paper will argue that, while in
the short-run, states may not substantially affect the behavior of mining
operations by changing the tax structure, the long-run incidence of the
tax may ultimately fall on the owners of the resource base within the
jurisdiction (which might be the state itself).
An Economic Model of the Mine. '
From an economic perspective, the mine operator seeks to maximize
the present value derived from extracting and processing reserves. While
profit maximization is the assumed objective of any type of supplier, two
characteristics distinguish the mining problem from other forms of eco-
nomic activity. First, the quantity of geological reserves within a given
property is exogenously determined and thus outside the mine operators
control. This fact forces the mine operator to make intertemperal trade-
offs with regard to the time path of extraction. Reserves extracted today
will increase current revenue, but at a cost of lost revenues in the future.
Thus, the operator must calculate the opportunity cost (the user cost) of
*Research Associate, Harvard Institute for International Development and Lecturer in Eco-
nomics, Harvard University.
1. The model described below has been developed extensively elsewhere. See R. Conrad,
Taxation and the Theory of the Mine (1978) (unpublished doctoral thesis in University of Wisconsin
at Madison library); R. CONRAD AND R. HOOL, GRADE VARIATION, ENDOGENOUS RE-
SERVES AND THE THEORY OF THE MINE (1979), and R. CONRAD AND R. HOOL, TAX-
ATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES (1980) for a complete description.
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foregone future extraction in order to maximize the present value of the
mine.'
Second, every mineral deposit is unique. The fault structure, depth,
and type of overburden for each deposit will determine, in part, the type
of technology employed and the level of costs. In addition, the quality
of the reserves varies across (and in non-petroleum mines varies within)
deposits.3 These facts have two consequences. First, the operator must
determine which qualities (i.e., grades) of ore to extract and when to
extract them. The mine operator must also determine the level of eco-
nomically recoverable reserves. The cost structure and time path of prices
may dictate a cut-off grade below which extraction of the geological
reserve is unprofitable. The uniqueness of each deposit results in a second
consequence; variability of the cut-off grade in accordance with price
changes. Both the short-run and long-run supply curves for the firm and
the entire industry are upward sloping. Increases in price lower the cut-
off grade and increase extraction from a particular mine. Also, new mines
will open at higher prices and further increase supply.
In order to analyze these factors, the following simple model will be
used. Profit in any time period (t) is defined as:
G
(1) 7T, = P, I tXXs - C(X 1 ;O)
g=l
where:
P, = Price of output in time t
= Reserves of type (grade) g extracted andprocessed in time t.
_ Proportion of X,g sold (i.e., the grade of
otg 
= g)
G
X, = , cgX,g = Total output in time t
g= 1
Q Total cost of extraction and processing in
time t.
X,= Total extraction in time t.
0 = Vector of geological factors affecting costs
G = Number of grades of ore in the deposit
Note that in this form, the miner extracts a linear combination of different
2. For a complete definition of user cost, see A. SCOTT, THE THEORY OF THE MINE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF CERTAINTY (1967).
3. See L. THOMAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO MINING (1973) for a description of the var-
iations and how they affect the technology and cost.
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ores, each with a different value, i.e., Potg is the value (marginal revenue)
of ore g in period t. The fact that reserves of each grade are finite in the
deposit implies:
T(2) R9 -_ I Xtg -v-g = 1, .... G.
t=o
i.e. the miner is constrained by the amount of reserves of each grade.
With this notation, the operator confronts the problem of choosing the
quantity of ore of each grade for extraction in each period so as to
maximize the present value of the mine, i.e.
Choose Xg for -v- t,g so that
T G
(3) PV = 2 P, 2 %X,- C(X,)
t=o g=l
(I + r)'
where: r = discount rate is a maximum subject to the con-
straint in (2).
Briefly, the analytical solution to the problem requires that the discounted
marginal profit from extraction in any period of a particular grade be "at
least as great" as the discounted marginal profit derived from extracting
that grade in any other period, i.e.4
(4) p_ _ - C'.1 :- Piotg - C'Xj .-€_ J
(4 + i)'x (1 + i)J
This condition simply means that the firm will only choose to extract a
particular grade when the discounted marginal profit covers the oppor-
tunity cost of extracting it at some other date. Higher grade reserves
always yield higher current revenue. The quantity of high grades, how-
ever, is finite. Clearly, the firm would choose to take the best grades
when their contribution to discounted profits is the greatest. The model
considered here can show that the best grades will be extracted in the
periods with the highest discounted prices until the best grades are ex-
hausted.' This result implies that the firm will order the grade selection
profile according to the ranking of discounted prices until exhausted, then
the next best grade is extracted.
Finally, the miner must determine the quantity of economically re-
4. A formal proof of this proposition is in CONRAD & HOOL (1979), supra note 1.
5. Id. For an engineer's perspective of this type of rule, see Walduck, Justification of the Concept
of High-Grading in Metal Ore Bodies-A Dissenting View, 1374 MINING MAG. 65 (1976).
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coverable reserves. He must determine the cut-off grade. In the current
model, the cut-off grade is defined as:6
(5) ot* - k
P,
where: k = period of lowest discounted price for which there
is positive extraction.
At this grade, marginal profit is zero and extracting any grade below otg*
will only result in a decrease in both current and discounted profit.7 For
example, consider the case where all prices are constant in nominal terms.
In this case, the grade selection profile will be a decreasing function of
time. Less ore will be extracted and processed in the future than in the
early periods and extraction will stop (and the mine will close) when the
firm reaches the grade yielding marginal revenues equal to the minimum
of the average cost curve.
In summary, the operator must determine the quantity of reserves and
the grades of ore to extract in any period, and the quantity of economically
recoverable reserves (those above the cut-off grade). These determinations
are made by relating the geological characteristics of the deposit to the
economic environment. Clearly the value of the reserve base (the present
value), given its geological structure, is sensitive to economic parameters.
For instance, an increase in price will increase the present value for two
reasons. First, those reserves that would have been extracted at a lower
price are now more valuable. Second, the cut-off grade is decreased,
which increases the quantity of economically recoverable reserves. On
the other hand, increases in cost will decrease the present value by in-
creasing the cut-off grade and decreasing the value of those ores which
are extracted.
Incentives Created by Variable Rate Taxes8
Various states in the U.S. have introduced several variable rate taxes.
Two of these taxes will be analyzed here: 1) Per Unit taxes which change
6. For numerical examples of these rules, see Conrad (1978), supra note 1; CONRAD & HOOL
(1979), supra note 1, and Conrad, Mining Taxation: A Numerical Introduction, 36 NAT'L Tax J.
443 (1980).
7. Cut-off grade calculations are much more complicated. Lane describes these factors in more
detail in Choosing the Optimum Cut-off Grade, 59 Q. COLO. SCHOOL OF MINES 811 (1964).
8. The analysis of this section is based on an article in process by Conrad and Hool, Grade
Variation, Endogenous Reserves and Mining Taxation, J. of PUB. ECON. (forthcoming); Peterson,
The Long-Run Dynamics of Mineral Taxation (1976) (unpublished manuscript, The University of
Maryland), and M. GILLIS, TAXATION AND MINING (1976).
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in relation to some price index (Colorado, 9 North Dakota,' ° and New
Mexico-oil and gas"). 2) Ad valorum put out taxes with rates that change
due to changes in price (New Mexico-uranium 2).
Per Unit Variable Taxes
This tax is based on the tonnage of output ($T/ore) and is related to
some price index that may change through time. For instance, the North
Dakota Coal Severance Tax 3 increases by one-cent for 1% change in the
Wholesale Price Index. This tax decreases the net-of-tax price received
by the firm in each period by a fixed amount, i.e.
(6) Pe, = P, - T,
where: Pe, = Net of Tax Price
T= Severance Tax in Period t.
Discounted profit in any period is now:
G
(7) 7T, = (P, - T,) I CsX s - C' (X,)
g= 1
(I + i),
Generally, this type of tax will have two effects. First, it will increase
the cut-off grade, since:
()C'k C',,
(8) ots =-~ > (X*g =- oPk - Tk Pk
where: C' = minimum of the average cost
This means that less reserves are now economically recoverable and thus
the life of the mine will tend to be shorter. 4 Second, the tax may inter-
temporally reallocate the smaller economically recoverable base between
the periods for which extraction is positive. To see this, recall that the
operator will extract the best grades when the discounted prices are higher.
The introduction of the tax may change the ranking because:
9. For a description of current tax policy in the states, see CONRAD AND HOOL (1980), supra
note 1, and Stinson, State Taxation of Mineral Deposits and Production, Rural Development Report
#2; USDA (1978).
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Link, Political Constraints and North Dakota's Coal Severance Tax, 31 NAT'L TAX J.
263 (1978) for a discussion of how this tax developed.
14. This is known as tax induced "high-grading." See GILLIS, supra note 8, for details.
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(9) P >(I + i)y (I + i)j
does not imply that
P,-T, Pj - T
(1+i t  (1+i)J
unless
P, Pi T, T_
(1 + i)y (I + i)j  (I + i), (I + i j
This condition is clearly satisfied when the tax rises at the rate of interest
(since the right hand side of (11) is zero), but in other cases it will depend
on how prices move through time in relation to how the tax changes."1
Indeed, real prices (even nominal prices) could fall through time while
the tax is rising.
Finally, the tax may change total extraction in each period. The direc-
tion could be from the future to the present or present to future depending
on how the tax changes in each period. Generally, extraction will increase
in periods with a relatively lower real tax burden. The current structure
of these taxes in practice means this reallocation will be from the present
to the future because the tax changes are usually smaller than the change
in the index used. As noted above, the North Dakota tax increases one
cent for every 1% rise in the Wholesale Price Index. Thus, for any
reasonable discount rate (including inflation), the tax will fall in real
terms causing a reallocation from the present to the future. Note, however,
that this reallocation to the future pertains only to the lower level of
economically recoverable reserves. The net effect on the mine life will
depend on how many reserves are lost relative to the deferred extraction
of recoverable reserves induced by the tax.
Variable Ad Valorum Taxes Which Are a Function of the Price
This type of tax is defined as a certain percentage of the selling price
with the marginal rate increasing as a function of the nominal price.
Discounted profit in any period is now defined as:
G
( - 3(P,)) I otgXg - C(Xt)(12) "tr2, g = 1
(1 + i)
where: j,(P,) = average tax rate with 0,'p, > 0.
15. For a discussion of "exponentially" increasing taxes, see Peterson, supra note 8, and Burness,
On Taxation of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources, 3 J. ENVT'L ECON. & MGMT. 289 (1976).
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Assuming competitive behavior, the tax rate is exogenous. Like the per
unit tax, this tax clearly increases the cut-off grade, reducing economically
recoverable reserves, since:
C'k C'k
S (1P-3 (Pk))Pk Pk
The rates of these taxes are a function of the price of the resource. Thus
difference in discounted prices would tend to be smaller than in the no
tax case. This implies that the remaining reserves (those above the cut-
off grade) would be extracted in a more even manner (variations in
production through time might not be as great). Finally, the ordering of
the grade selection profile may change. In order to see this note:
P,__ Pi(14) P, > i
(1 + i)j  (1 + i)i
will imply
' (1 -13(P)) P, (1 -13(Pj)) Pi(I + i)i (I + i)j
if and only if:
(1) 1 -13(P 1 )
(16) 1 < -- _ (1 + i) -'" >
P 1 - P3(P,)
This condition will generally hold in practice with one exception. If
Pt > Pj, then the right hand side of (16) is greater than one. Then, condition
(16) could be violated if the change in the tax rate is sufficiently large.
To see this, suppose that in t = o, P0 = 100 and in t = 1, P, = 101.
If the discount rate were 10%, the left hand side of (16) would be equal
to 1.111. If the royalty rate at 100 were 10%, but doubled to 20% on
prices greater than 100 the right hand side of (16) would be 1. 125, which
would violate the condition. Thus, in this case the answer depends on
how much the the tax rate changes with respect to nominal prices: the
greater the change in tax rates, the greater the likelihood that a change
in the grade selection and extraction profiles will result.
III. SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE
World markets determine the time path of prices of most minerals. Tax
policy, however, is made by political subdivisions of these markets. When
a particular state increases the tax burden on mineral operations, two
July 19821
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things generally happen. In the short-run, the producer will attempt to
shift the tax by increasing the price. "Pass-through" clauses in contracts
may enable him to do this in the short-run. Nevertheless, contracts do
expire and they can be broken. Thus consumers will begin to look for
alternative sources of supply or begin to substitute with another input.
Clearly consumers would be willing to pay up to the new price level for
an alternative source. If the consumers can get an alternative for less than
the new price, then they will have every incentive to seek the alternative
source.
If consumers are successful, even in part, in finding alternative sources,
then the price to the producer will not increase by the amount of the tax
and the results of the last section will hold: cut-off grades will rise, and
extraction profiles will change. In the longer run, the producer, knowing
that the net-of-tax return to invested capital is now lower, will attempt
to lower costs by shifting the tax back on to owners of the resources
themselves. If the producer owns the mineral rights by prior contract, he
can do very little in the short-run to shift the tax. At lower prices, however,
he clearly will not be willing to pay the same amount for mineral rights
in the future. Thus, if the producer's efforts to shift the tax to landowners
meet resistance, capital will leave the region. Investment and exploration
activity in the area will decrease with a corresponding increase in these
activities in other jurisdictions until the net of tax return to capital is equal
between the jurisdictions. The mobility of capital and labor over time
thus suggests which factor bears the long-run incidence of the tax: the
landowner who would have had his reserves developed (or developed
more completely) if the tax had not been imposed. ' 6
In order to understand this process, consider the following example. 7
Suppose there are two regions that supply a given resource: State A, and
the rest of the world. In any time period, equilibrium requires that supply
will equal demand, i.e.
(17) D = Sa + S,
where: D = Quantity demanded in the market
S. = Supply from A
Sw = Supply from the rest of the world.
The "net" demand for A's product is then:
16. See McClure, Jr., Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources,
31(3) NAT'L TAX J. 275 (1980); Gillis and McClure, Jr., The Incidence of World Taxes on Natural
Resources, With Special Reference to Bauxite, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 2 (1975); and A. ATKINSON
& J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1980) for a discussion of incidence with
immobile factors.
17. This analysis is based on A. HARBERGER, TAXATION AND WELFARE (1974).
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(18) Sa = D - S,
Graph I depicts this situation. The right hand side of the panel shows D
and Sw. The left hand panel shows A's supply curve and A's net demand
curve. The net demand curve is derived by calculating the excess demand
at each price for D - SW and plotting the difference on the left hand
panel. In the absence of taxation, the price that each producer receives
and the price the consumers pay will be equal. This equality is shown as
P on Graph I, where A supplies Sa, W supplies S, and by definition S.
+ Sw = D.
Now suppose the government of A imposes a tax of $T/ton. The pro-
ducer in A will attempt to shift the tax forward by increasing the price.
Thus, the supply curve for A will shift to the left from Sa to Sa on Graph
I. If there is any elasticity in A's net demand curve and A's supply curve
is less than perfectly elastic, then at least part of the tax will be borne
by the factors of production in A. This result is shown on Graph I where
the world price is now Pw, but the price the producers in A receive is
only Pg. Output in A falls to S., W's output rises to S,, and equilibrium
is defined by S, + Sw = D. Note that producers in W have been made
better-off. In effect, they have received a "wind-fall" from the change
in A's tax policy. The burden of the tax is thus borne by all consumers
and the producers in region A. Consumers bear an amount equal to the
area P Pw AE on the left panel in Graph I, while producers in A bear an
amount equal to the area P Pg EC (with the sum of these two areas Pg
Pw AC being equal to the tax revenue). The share of the tax burden borne
by consumers and producers is known to be inversely proportional to the
elasticities of supply and demand:
P Pw AE ESA
P E P§C EDA
In this case the elasticity of demand for A's output is equal to:
D Sw
(20) EDA = D E, - - tsw
Sa Sa
where: D = Total quantity demanded
SA = Supply of A
E = Elasticity of the demand curve
Sw = Supply of W
ESw = Elasticity of supply from W.
Thus, the smaller the share of A's output, the greater the supply elasticity
of W; and the greater elasticity of aggregate demand, the larger will be
July 1982]
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the share of the tax borne by the factors in A. In the short-run each factor
may bear part of the burden. In the longer run, however, the burden will
be borne by the factor that is least able to move to another jurisdiction,
the reserves which are left in the ground.
Finally, note that the introduction of the tax has created a welfare cost'8
equal to the area ACD. The loss in consumer surplus (AED) results for
two reasons. First, consumers are paying more and getting less. The
portion of the welfare loss attributable to this reason equals the area IJK
on the right panel. Second, factors are used inefficiently in W due to its
increased output. The area FGH on the right panel represents the portion
of the welfare loss attributable to inefficiency. Thus, ADE = FHG +
IJK. The lower part of the welfare triangle (EDC) represents the loss in
producer surplus in A resulting from the tax. The introduction of the tax
thus decreases both the welfare of A's suppliers and the welfare of all
consumers (to the benefit of suppliers in W).
In summary, the ability of a given jurisdiction to permanently shift the
burden of the tax outside its region is small. There are too many sources
of supply, and increasing prices will bring them forth. Possibly the best
example of this type of result has been the recent experience of OPEC.
The price increases which occurred in the 1970s imposed a severe burden
on the entire world. This "tax" created "wind-falls" for non-OPEC pro-
ducers, and producers of alternative energy sources such as coal. The
recent increase in drilling activity in non-OPEC countries and the de-
velopment of new coal deposits and other forms of alternative energy
sources bear witness to the fact that there is a positive supply elasticity
in the rest of the world. This elasticity, combined with the decrease in
oil imports, has begun to stabilize world prices, increase the total sup-
ply,and decrease the transfer of wealth to the OPEC countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much of the public debate over natural resource policy in general and
mining taxation in particular has focused on the depletable nature of
mining activity. The amount of "geological" reserves within a certain
jurisdiction truly are finite and inelastically supplied. Nevertheless, tax
policy cannot be made solely on this basis because the level of mineral
activity and the quantity of "economically" recoverable reserves are not
inelastically supplied either in the short- or long-run. Rather, mining
activity will respond to the economic environment just like any other type
18. This assumes the demand and supply curves in Graph I are income compensated. Welfare
cost or efficiency cost is a measure of the dollar value of the deduction in economic welfare which
results from an artificially induced change in relative prices.
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of economic activity. Tax policy should be made with a full awareness
of the incentives created by it. Otherwise, a state or other jurisdiction
may introduce taxes which gain tax revenue in the short-run but at the
cost of long-term gains which would have accrued by a larger and more
prolonged level of investment.
